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Abstract
This paper investigates the factors aﬀecting the conservatism of accounting reports 
at the market-level and ﬁrm-level. At the market-level, law and institutional factors 
explain conservatism, while at the ﬁrm-level contracting is the driver. We predict 
and observe that while both levels jointly aﬀect conservatism, it is ﬁrm-level factors 
that play a dominant role. The conclusion suggests that it is more effective to 
improve the quality of accounting reports by motivating the ﬁrm’s own demand 
rather than through listing in a developed capital market.
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Introduction
Conservatism is an important attribute of high quality reporting. It is often used 
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to assess the quality of companies accounting reports. Ahmed (2002) argues 
that accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating bondholder-
shareholder conflicts over dividend policy, and in reducing firms’ debt costs; 
Ahmed (2007) argues that accounting conservatism can help reducing agency 
costs of ﬁrms; Watts (2003) argues that accounting conservatism is part of the 
eﬃcient mechanism employed in the organization of the ﬁrm, and it can reduce 
the ﬁrm’s expected litigation cost and present value of taxes and ultimately increase 
the value of the ﬁrm. Evidence suggests that accounting conservatism is important 
to firms’ thereby stimulating enquiry into the determinants of conservatism of 
accounting reports. In current US literature, Ball (2000, 2003, 2005) suggests 
the origin of law, institution, and market demand have effects on accounting 
conservatism; in international studies, Li and Lu (2003) considered the effects 
of conservatism on accruals and found the accounting conservatism in ﬁnancial 
reports of China A-share market listing ﬁrms. Li and Li (2005) suggest that in 
the China A-share market, the observed conservatism phenomena is due to the 
“big bath” of loss companies and not genuine conservatism but more to do with 
the earnings management of loss companies. Liu and Wang (2006) studied the 
influence of corporate governance on accounting conservatism and found that 
debt and ownership structure has an eﬀect on accounting conservatism. Most of 
the exiting literature focuses on the inﬂuence of one speciﬁc factor on accounting 
conservatism rather than on their joint eﬀects.
Based on prior literature, the paper makes a number of contributions:
1. Prior studies suggest many factors are related to accounting conservatism (Ball 
2000, Ball 2003, Ball 2005, Ahmed 2007). Almost all focus on a speciﬁc 
factor. In this paper, we group these factors into two levels: market-level and 
ﬁrm-level. Market-level factors include legal environment and institutional 
environment; ﬁrm-level factors include some of the ﬁrms own characteristics. 
We study factors inﬂuencing accounting conservatism under the market-ﬁrm 
framework.
2. Under market-ﬁrm framework, this paper studies the eﬀects of the two level 
factors on accounting conservatism, and then investigates whether there 
is a dominant level. We seek to show that the two levels do have effects 
on accounting conservatism, and we seek to determine which has greater 
inﬂuence. The research design compares China A-share listed companies with 
Hong Kong local listed companies in order to test the eﬀects of the two levels 
factors on accounting conservatism. Two steps were followed: ﬁrst we study 
the influence of market-level factors on accounting conservatism holding 
firm-level factors constant. To test this, we choose the AH-share listed 
companies as the sample and compare accounting conservatism of ﬁnancial 
reports of these companies in the A-share market with that in the H-share 
market; secondly, we study the inﬂuence of ﬁrm-level factors on accounting 
conservatism holding market-level factors constant. To test this, we selected 
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the Hong Kong local listed companies and H-share listed companies to form 
the sample and to make comparison of their accounting conservatism.
Prior research mostly studied one specific factor influencing accounting 
conservatism with either national or international data. In this paper, we study the 
eﬀects of several factors considered in prior research on accounting conservatism 
by forming special samples for comparison. In China, the Hong Kong stock 
market and mainland A-share stock market give us a special setting for this to 
be tested. The conclusion suggests that ﬁrm-level factors play a dominant role in 
determining the conservatism of accounting reports.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the factors 
inﬂuencing accounting conservatism mentioned in prior research and develops the 
hypotheses. The empirical study is presented in Section 3. Robust tests and our 
conclusion follow in sections 4 and 5.
Factors Inﬂuencing Accounting Conservatism  
and Hypotheses
1. Deﬁnition of Conservatism
Ball (2005) discusses the definitions of two types of accounting conservatism, 
specifically, conditional and unconditional accounting conservatism. 
Unconditional conservatism is defined as an accounting bias toward reporting 
low book values of stockholder equity. Under this deﬁnition a ﬁrm’s accounting 
is conservative if it delays revenue recognition by one period, or subtracts a 
constant from earnings every period independently of current economic gains 
and losses. Conditional conservatism, on the other hand, stresses the timeliness 
of loss recognition. Under conditional conservatism, the reduction in accounting 
earnings reﬂects a contemporaneous economic loss. It is not caused by an earlier 
expense recognition, deferring revenue, or under-reporting income or book value 
on a regulated basis. Under unconditional conservatism, when the downward bias 
is known and is adjustable, the conservatism should have very little impact on 
contracting. However, when the bias is hard to assess due to arbitrary discretion, 
the accounting conservatism is likely to reduce contracting efficiency. Under 
conditional conservatism, accounting conservatism can increase eﬃciency of debt 
contracting, compensation contracting and corporate governance. Therefore, only 
conditional conservatism should be used as an indicator of a high quality ﬁnancial 
report. In this paper, we deﬁne conservatism to be conditional conservatism based 
on the treatment by Basu (1997).
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2. Factors Inﬂuencing Accounting Conservatism
Conservatism is an important characteristic of high quality financial reports. 
The focus of debate has been to identify factors that influence financial report 
conservatism. There are both national and international studies. Ball (2000) 
suggests that the legal system can influence the conservatism of accounting 
reports and that common-law accounting income exhibits significantly greater 
conservatism than code-law accounting income. Ball (2003) suggests also that the 
institutional environment can inﬂuence accounting conservatism by inﬂuencing 
report preparers’ incentives; so in this regard common-law accounting income 
is not necessarily more conservative than code-law accounting income; Ball 
(2005) ﬁnds that even in environments with the same law origin and institutional 
environment, that the ﬁnancial reports of listed companies are conservative. This is 
not found though for private companies, thereby suggesting that market demand 
plays a key role in determining accounting conservatism. Bushman (2006) explores 
financial reporting incentives created by an economy’s institutional structure, 
suggesting that a country’s legal/judicial system, securities laws, and political 
economy create incentives that influence the behavior of corporate executive, 
investors, regulators and other market participants, and these incentives ultimately 
influence the accounting conservatism. Watts (2003) suggests that corporate 
contracts, litigation, taxation et al can inﬂuence accounting conservatism. Ahmed 
(2002) finds that firms facing more severe conflicts over dividend policy tend 
to use more conservative accounting while in a later paper (2007) he shows that 
governance mechanisms affect firms’ accounting conservatism. Beekes (2004) 
studies the link between accounting conservatism and the composition of the 
board of directors.
From this collective prior research, we can see that the factors influencing 
accounting conservatism can be classified into two groups: firstly, market-level 
factors including legal systems and the institutional environment; secondly, ﬁrm-
level factors, such as the ﬁrm’s own demand for conservative reports. Hence, it 
appears that international studies, such as Ball (2000), Ball (2003), Bushman 
(2006) are concerned with the influence of market-level factors on accounting 
conservatism while the national studies, Ahmed (2002), Ahmed (2007), Beekes 
(2004) are concerned with the influence of firm-level factors on accounting 
conservatism.
Market-level factors include both legal systems and the institutional 
environment. Ball (2005) is concerned with the influence of legal origins on 
accounting conservatism, namely common law and code law. These two legal 
origins exhibit different features. Common law follows the market-oriented 
and shareholder model, where shareholders and bondholders are diverse, and 
information asymmetry is resolved through public disclosure rather than through 
inside communication, and litigation costs are high. Code law focuses on the 
planning-oriented and stakeholder model, where shareholdings are concentrated, 
debt tends to be private, and information asymmetry is resolved through insider 
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communication rather than public disclosure, and income recognition considers 
the interests of each stakeholder. Because of these diﬀerences, companies under 
common law have more demands for conservative reports. Companies under 
common law are more likely to prepare conservative reports when compared to 
companies under code law.
Factors influencing reporting incentives with an impact on accounting 
conservatism include the judicial system, the development of capital markets, 
political economy, and standard setting. More speciﬁcally, conservatism is related 
to the fairness of the judicial system, protection of investors, the degree of political 
intervention in the economy, and companies’ ﬁnancing channels. These factors 
have either an individual eﬀect or a joint eﬀect on accounting conservatism. In 
a capital market with a high level of investor protection and a well developed 
judicial system, shareholders will be more likely to sue the company for their loss. 
Therefore, if there is a problem in the ﬁnancial reports, the likelihood of companies 
facing expensive litigation will be higher in this environment. In order to obviate 
expensive litigation eﬀects, companies will be motivated to adopt conservatism in 
accounting reports. In a less developed capital market, companies may need to seek 
private ﬁnancing for their capitals needs. In this case, the demand for conservative 
reports is reduced, because companies resolve conﬂicts, not by additional public 
disclosure, but more by private communication (Ball 2003). Further, in less 
developed markets shareholdings tend to be concentrated, so larger shareholders 
do not necessarily need ﬁnancial reports to monitor corporate operations. Due 
to their knowledge about the company and the close relationship with managers, 
the demand for conservative reports will be reduced. The degree of intervention 
and the role of government in the economy have joint effects on accounting 
conservatism. If a government is “benevolent”, it will assume control over poorly 
performing firms. Companies will report good news in a timely manner but 
delay the reporting of bad news so as to avoid government control. In this case, 
accounting reports do not exhibit conservatism. If a government is “self-serving”, 
it will extract some resources from companies when ﬁrms perform well, and this 
will motivate companies to recognize bad news in a timely manner but delay the 
reporting of good news to avoid paying out resources. Therefore, the company’s 
accounting reports will demonstrate conservatism. Bushman (2006) discusses this 
phenomenon and provides empirical evidence. Companies with high-intervention 
from government bear more responsibilities such as employment, local economic 
development and stability, and they are less concerned with accounting report 
conservatism. 
Firm-level factors determine if the company itself instigates the demand for 
conservative reports. Watts (2003) suggests factors such as corporate contracts, 
litigation and taxation will determine a company’s demand for accounting 
conservatism. Corporate contracts include debt contracts and management 
compensation contracts. In debt contracting, the creditors receive a ﬁxed income. 
They are not entitled to receive additional income despite bearing additional risks 
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from actions taken by managers. On the other hand, shareholders and managers 
enjoy additional income but bear limited losses from high risk operations. Under 
such circumstances, creditors are concerned with whether the net assets of the 
company are sufficient to meet their principal and interest. Hence they want 
timely recognition of losses and delayed recognition of income. Creditors will be 
interested in accounting conservatism when decisions are made about lending 
because the more conservative the reports, the less information asymmetry they 
face. Therefore, companies reliant on higher levels of debt ﬁnancing are inclined to 
use conservative reports to ensure successful ﬁnancing and reduce ﬁnancing costs. 
In earnings-based compensation contracts, managers are inclined to report higher 
earnings so as to maximum their compensation. Possessing inside knowledge 
about companies operations but with limited tenure protection, managers tend 
to choose projects which produce short-term positive net present values but 
long-term negative net present values, in order to maximize their compensation 
payments. Due to limited tenure, any excessive compensation cannot be recovered 
and is a permanent loss for company. Conservative reports can recognize eventual 
losses in a timelier manner by acknowledging disadvantageous projects earlier, 
thereby reducing the tendency for managers to engage in opportunistic behavior. 
This will increase the eﬃciency of the compensation contracts and the ﬁrm’s value. 
In order to make compensation contracts more eﬀective and reduce agency cost 
and increase ﬁrm value, companies with severe information asymmetry will adopt 
conservative reports. Companies belonging to a high litigation risk industry will 
also adopt conservative reports to reduce litigation risk and cost.
Market-level and firm-level factors have joint effects on accounting 
conservatism. No accounting report is subject to the inﬂuence of only one level 
and not the other. Market-level factors set the requirements for conservatism while 
firm-level factors provide the demands for accounting conservatism. Therefore, 
even though ﬁrm-level factors provide the demands for accounting conservatism, 
reports may still not be conservative if not required by market-level factors. Even 
if market-level factors require accounting conservatism, the reports may be not 
conservative if not demanded by firm-level factors. Accounting reports will be 
conservative when demanded by both market-level factors and ﬁrm-level factors. 
                 
3. Hypotheses
The oﬃcial name of an A-share is RMB common stock and is issued by domestic 
companies in mainland China and traded in RMB by domestic institutions and 
individuals (not including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau). The A-share market 
adopts the T+1 settlement system and places a 10% limit on upward or downward 
price movements in each trading day. According to the investors’ classiﬁcation, 
A-shares can be classiﬁed into state-owned shares, legal-entity shares and individual 
shares. Due to government restrictions, state-owned shares and legal-entity shares 
are viewed as public shares and could not be traded on the stock market before 
the reform of non-tradable shares in 2005. A-share listed companies are subject to 
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“Company Law”, “Securities Law” and various rules promulgated by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, which also governs the listed companies.4
H-shares are formed by companies from China mainland listing on the Hong 
Kong stock market. Most of the listed companies are large-scale companies from 
key industries. Many are leading enterprises in their industries, have far-reaching 
impact on downstream business and play a vital role in national economic 
development. Listed on the Hong Kong capital market, H-share companies 
are subject to the “Listing Rules”, “Securities and Futures Ordinance” and the 
governance of Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission.5
  Companies issuing A-shares on the China mainland stock market while also 
issuing H-shares on the Hong Kong stock market are AH-share listed companies. 
Most of these are large-scale state-owned companies. AH-share companies 
are not subject to requirements of the Hong Kong capital market but also the 
requirements of the China mainland capital market.  
At the market-level, Ball (2003) notes that due to its special colonial history, 
the law source of Hong Kong is common law whereas the law origin of China 
is code law. Compared with the China mainland, the economy of HK has less 
government intervention, while the capital market is more developed. At the 
market-level, companies in HK are more likely to issue conservative reports than 
would companies on the China mainland. At the firm-level, Li and Li (2005) 
note that listed companies in China mainland have less demand for accounting 
conservatism from firm-level factors such as debt contracts, management and 
compensation contracts. For HK local share companies, all shares are tradable and 
debt contracts and executive compensation are both factored in by the market. 
Zhang (2005) suggests that in HK, most listed companies other than Chinese-
funded companies rely on equity and bank ﬁnancing. At the ﬁrm-level, companies 
in HK are more likely than companies in the China mainland to prepare 
conservative reports. Based on this discussion, our ﬁrst hypothesis is stated thus: 
H1: HK local share companies’ exhibit more accounting conservatism than 
A-share companies.
AH-share companies issue A-shares in China mainland and H-shares in HK. They 
face the same ﬁrm-level factors but diﬀerent market-level factors. Based on our 
prior literature review and discussion, hypothesis two is stated thus:
   
H2: H-share companies exhibit more accounting conservatism than A-share 
companies. 
4 These can be found on the oﬃcial website of Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
5 This can be found in the oﬃcial website of HK Stock Exchange.
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H-share companies listed on the HK capital market are affected by the same 
market-level factors as HK local share companies. They will not present diﬀerent 
levels of conservatism on market-level factors alone. However, the ﬁrm-level factors, 
namely, the demands of contracting became dominant in causing differential 
conservatism. Most of the H-share companies are large-scale state-owned, with 
state ownership determining the diﬀerent demand for accounting conservatism. 
With respect to debt contracts, H-share companies also need debt ﬁnance. Because 
they have the backing of “large-scale state-ownership”, banks are not especially 
concerned about accounting report quality when they make lending decisions and 
the interest rate. These state-owned companies do not need to be concerned with 
reporting quality and are motivated to apply accounting conservatism more from 
the point of view of obtaining debt ﬁnancing at low cost. Financing of some large-
scale state-owned companies is undertaken by government, so companies are not 
motivated to engage in conservative accounting. Sun et al (2005) ﬁnds that the 
inﬂuence of debt contracts on accounting conservatism is smaller in state-owned 
listed companies than that in other companies. Wang and Sun (2006) ﬁnd that 
the need for conservatism accounting by banks is reduced due to the quasi-creditor 
relationship between state-owned listed companies and state-owned commercial 
banks.
For debt contracts, the demand for accounting conservatism is much less for 
H-share companies. As to compensation contracts, the separation of ownership 
and control give rise to agency cost (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 
1983a, 1983b). H-share companies mostly are state-owned companies with 
the state being the large shareholder. The state is not in a position to directly 
manage the company, so an agent is designated instead. Here the manager is the 
representative of the largest shareholder, resulting in immaterial agency problems 
and less need for conservative reporting to constrain manager’s opportunistic 
behavior. Furthermore, if the manager decides the terms of the compensation 
contract, non-pecuniary career development and other “grayer income” are more 
important. In Chinese state-owned listed companies Chen et al (2005) notes that 
a regulation exists to limit the size of managerial compensation. Hence, there is 
a need for non-pecuniary compensation as an alternative choice for managers. 
Tong (2005) argues that the economic reason for the executive of state-owned 
companies’ receiving low compensation but remaining is that position is because 
they can receive certain “gray income” by exercising control rights. As a result, 
the demand by H-share companies for accounting conservatism stemming from 
compensation contracts is low. Overall, from a consideration of ﬁrm-level factors, 
there is not much demand for accounting conservatism in H-share companies.
Zhang (2005) suggests that except for Chinese-funded listed companies, there 
are two kinds companies: family model ﬁrms and UK-American model ﬁrms. UK-
American model ﬁrms that are ﬁnanced by the stock market or banks, have diverse 
shareholders and agency problems between shareholders and managers. This type 
of company has a demand for accounting conservatism. Family model companies 
can obtain finance from family parties, while bank finance and equity finance 
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are also important. These family-related companies grow and expand; they adopt 
western advanced governance models and recruit many professional managers 
from the labour market. When family model companies evolve to that stage, 
they are close to UK-American model ﬁrms. Based on ﬁrm-level factors, there are 
demands for accounting conservatism in this type of HK local share company. Ball 
(2003) concludes that of conservatism studied in four East Asian countries, HK 
companies have the most conservative reports. They also are closest to companies 
in common law countries in terms of accounting conservatism. Based on this 
discussion, the third hypothesis is stated thus:
H3: HK local share companies’ exhibit more accounting conservatism thank 
do H-share companies’ accounting reports based on the diﬀerences in ﬁrm-
level factors.
Empirical Study
This paper adopts Basu’s (1997) definition of accounting conservatism as a 
tendency by accountants to require a higher degree of verification in financial 
statements for recognizing good news than for bad news. We adopt two models 
in our empirical study: earning-price model in Basu (1997) and accrual-cash 
ﬂow model in Ball (2005). The earning-price model in Basu (1997) is the most 
widely used model in conservatism research. However, a precondition for its 
implementation is the presence of a well developed stock market. Because the 
stock market in China is less developed, we also adopt the second model, accrual-
cash ﬂow model in Ball (2005). We establish our ﬁnal samples according to each 
model’s requirements, and this resulted in unequal sample sizes under the two 
models.
1. Earning-price Model
In this paper we adopt the earning-price model as follows:
 NI = ß0+ß01CD+ß1RD+ß11RD*CD+ß2R+ß21R*CD+ß3 R*RD+ß31R*RD*CD
Variables: Pope (1999) shows that inclusion or exclusion of extraordinary items 
in accounting reporting will inﬂuence the results of conservatism comparison. To 
account for this we adopt two earnings variables: NIt=EPSt/Pt-1 or NIt=operating 
income/(number of tradable shares*Pt-1+number of non-tradable shares*net asset 
per sharet-1)
6,  EPSt is the earnings per share at year t; Pt-1 is the closing price at 
6 In following study, earning 1 represents the ﬁrst, and earning 2 represents the second.  
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year t-1; R is the stock return (May to next April due to the deadline of auditing 
report); RD is dummy variable which equal 1 when R<0, otherwise equal 0; CD 
is dummy variable. When we compare HK local share companies with A-share 
companies, CD=0 for A-share companies, CD=1 for HK local share companies. 
When we compare two kinds of accounting reports of AH-share companies, 
CD=0 for accounting report in China mainland, and CD=1 for accounting 
report in HK market. When we compare HK local share companies and H-share 
companies, CD=0 for H-share companies, CD=1 for HK local share companies.
 Sample: The ﬁrm/years for the four kinds of listed companies (HK local share 
companies, H-share companies, AH-share companies, and A-share companies) 
were selected from WIND database over the period 2003-2005 using the 
following procedure. First, we delete H-share companies and Red Chip Stocks 
companies, the remaining companies with ﬁscal year from Jan to Dec to form HK 
local share companies. We delete AH-share, AB-share in A-share market to form 
A-share companies. Second, we delete companies from the ﬁnance and insurance 
industry. Third, for each variable the two extreme percentiles of firm/years 
observations are eliminated. Fourth, all ﬁrm/years with missing values for stock 
returns and earnings variables are eliminated. 
Table 1 contains sample descriptive statistics. The samples are pooled firm/
years, with sample sizes ranging from 61 to 3135. Table 1 reports means, medians 
and standard deviations for annual returns and earnings. Returns are considerably 
more volatile for HK local shares than in both H-share and A-share, the same 
volatility for experienced earnings. For example, relative to HK local shares, 
the A-share has approximately 73% less stock volatility, but 79% less earning 
1 volatility, the H-share has approximately 60% less stock volatility, but 63% 
less earning 1 volatility. This may be a sign of a greater degree of “smoothing” of 
accounting income in A-share companies and H-shares. For AH-shares, returns 
are less volatile in HK than in China mainland, while earnings by contrast are 
more volatile in HK than in the China mainland. This is consistent with greater 
“smoothing” of accounting income in the China mainland, with longer lags to 
incorporate value changes.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
N Return Earning 1 Earning 2
mean med std mean med std mean med std
HK local share 781 0.324 0.000 1.440 0.061 0.080 0.275 0.105 0.092 0.269 
H-share 107 0.105 -0.018 0.578 0.064 0.061 0.103 0.108 0.108 0.128 
A-share 3135 0.064 0.000 0.386 0.008 0.017 0.057 0.030 0.034 0.089 
AH-share HK 61 0.024 0.025 0.033 0.095 0.091 0.073 0.359 0.277 0.251 
AH-share mainland 61 -0.006 -0.010 0.035 0.043 0.040 0.036 0.141 0.112 0.089 
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Table 2: Comparison between A-share Companies and HK Local Share 
Companies
Earning 1 Earning 2
Beta t Sig Beta t Sig
(Constant) 0.014*** 2.743 0.006 0.032*** 6.052 0.000 
R 0.021** 2.053 0.040 0.048*** 4.292 0.000 
RD -0.005 -0.581 0.561 -0.001 -0.068 0.945 
R*RD 0.036 1.452 0.146 0.040 1.511 0.131 
CD 0.086*** 9.541 0.000 0.125*** 12.853 0.000 
R*CD -0.023** -2.125 0.034 -0.060*** -5.050 0.000 
RD*CD -0.022 -1.355 0.175 -0.037** -2.100 0.036 
R*RD*CD 0.119*** 2.949 0.003 0.150*** 3.411 0.001 
F statistic 32.056 52.072
Adj. R2 0.053 0.084
N 3916 3916
Notes: *,**,*** denote signiﬁcance levels at 10% , 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 2 contains the results for H1. Following Basu (1997), we focus on the 
slope of R*RD*CD which indicates the incremental recognition of losses in HK 
local share companies compared with A-share companies. In earning 1 group, 
the incremental slope is positive 0.119 and statistically signiﬁcant. In earning 2 
group, the incremental slope is positive 0.15 and statistically signiﬁcant. The larger 
incremental slope in earning 2 suggests that compared with A-share companies, 
HK local share companies are more inclined to recognize losses above the 
operating income line. The R*CD reﬂects that relative to the China companies, the 
diﬀerence of timeliness in recognizing good news in Hong Kong local companies. 
As shown in Table 2, the coeﬃcients are -.023 and -.06 for earning 1 and earning 
2, respectively. This indicates that Hong Kong local companies tend to have lower 
timeliness in recognizing good news than China companies. This is consistent due 
to diﬀerences in the factors in both levels; HK local share companies’ accounting 
reports are more conservative than those of A-share companies’.
Table 3 contains the results for H2. In this table, the slopes of R*RD*CD 
are positive but insigniﬁcant, meaning that the AH share companies accounting 
reports in Hong Kong do not recognize bad news in a more timely fashion than 
their reports in China. We therefore are unable to reject the hypothesis that AH-
share companies’ accounting reports in H-share markets and in A-share markets 
follow identical loss recognition practices. This result does not support H2, and 
it suggests that even with differences in market-level factors, there may not be 
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in accounting conservatism when ﬁrm-level factors are the 
same. There is a possibility that ﬁrm-level factors play a dominant role.
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Table 3: Comparison between AH-share Companies’ Reports in HK and those 
in China Mainland
Earning 1 Earning 2
Beta t Sig. Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 0.051** 2.302 0.023 0.181** 2.604 0.011
R -0.085 -0.208 0.836 -0.145 -0.348 0.728 
RD 0.016 0.070 0.945 -0.020 -0.090 0.929 
R*RD 0.149 0.607 0.545 0.203 0.815 0.417 
CD 0.378* 1.736 0.085 0.336 1.513 0.133 
R*CD 0.234 0.721 0.472 0.291 0.886 0.378 
RD*CD -0.165 -0.756 0.451 0.121 0.567 0.572 
R*RD*CD 0.080 0.541 0.589 0.117 0.762 0.448 
F statistic 7.540 7.549
Adj. R2 0.274 0.292
N 122 122
Notes: *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 4 contains the results for H3. Because the companies in the ﬁnal sample 
of H-shares are all from the manufacturing industry, we choose companies 
from the same industry in HK local share sample to form the ﬁnal sample for 
comparison. The incremental slopes in the two groups are both positive and 
statistically signiﬁcant, which is consistent with higher accounting conservatism in 
HK local share companies compared with H-share companies due to the diﬀerent 
firm-level factors. It shows that, although the H-share and local Hong Kong 
companies are both subject to the same legal and institutional environment, the 
local Hong Kong ﬁrms still exhibit stronger accounting conservatism. In addition, 
the incremental slope in earning 2 is larger, which suggests that compared with 
H-share companies, HK local share companies are more inclined to recognize 
losses above the operating income line.
Table 4: Comparison between HK Local Share Companies and H-share 
Companies
Earning 1 Earning 2
Beta t Sig. Beta 1 Sig.
(Constant) 0.045 1.578 0.115 0.032*** 6.052 0.000 
R 0.094*** 2.620 0.009 0.048*** 4.292 0.000 
RD -0.001 -0.024 0.981 -0.001 -0.068 0.945 
R*RD -0.029 -0.311 0.756 0.040 1.511 0.131 
CD 0.064** 2.051 0.041 0.125*** 12.853 0.000 
R*CD -0.075** -2.014 0.045 -0.060*** -5.050 0.000 
RD*CD 0.001 0.025 0.980 -0.037** -2.100 0.036 
R*RD*CD 0.187* 1.767 0.078 0.150*** 3.411 0.001 
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Earning 1 Earning 2
Beta t Sig. Beta 1 Sig.
F statistic 32.056 52.072
Adj. R2 0.053 0.084
N 3916 3916
Notes: *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
2. Accrual-cash ﬂow model 
In this paper, we also adopt the accrual-cash ﬂow model of Ball (2005).
ACC = ß0 + ß1CFO + ß2RD+ß3CD+ß4CFO*RD+ß5CFO*CD+ß6RD*CD+ß7 
 CFO*RD*CD
Variables: CFO is cash ﬂow from operations; ACC is accruals measured as Net 
Income minus CFO; RD is a dummy variable which equals 1 when CFO<0, 
otherwise equals 0. CD is a dummy variable which distinguishes diﬀerent group 
companies. In the comparison between HK local share companies and A-share 
companies, CD=0 for A-share companies, CD=1 for HK local share companies; 
in the comparison between HK local share companies and H-share companies, 
CD=0 for H-share companies, CD=1 for HK local share companies; in the 
comparison between two kinds of accounting reports of AH-share companies, 
CD=0 for accounting report in China mainland, and CD=1 for accounting report 
in HK market.
Sample: The ﬁrm/years data for the three kinds of listed companies (HK local 
share companies, H-share companies, and A-share companies) were selected from 
WIND database over the period 2003-2005, and for AH-share companies over 
2000-2005 using the following procedure. First, we deleted H-share companies 
and Red Chip Stocks companies to form HK local share companies, and deleted 
AH-share, AB-share in A-share market to form A-share companies. Second, 
we deleted companies from the ﬁnance and insurance industry. Third, for each 
variable the two extreme percentiles of ﬁrm/years observations were eliminated. 
Fourth, we eliminated all ﬁrm/years data with missing values for CFO and ACC. 
Ball (2005) suggests that this model incorporates both roles of accruals: namely, 
the mitigation of noise in cash flow and asymmetric recognition of unrealized 
gains and losses. Accounting conservatism will exist if positive correlation between 
cash and accruals arising from the second role of accruals is greater in the case of 
losses. Hence we focus on the slope of CFO*RD*CD.
Table 5 contains sample descriptive statistics. Results for empirical study using 
the accrual-cash ﬂow model are contained in Table 6. In this Table, based on prior 
analysis, we focus on the slope of CFO*RD*CD. In the test for H1, the slope is 
positive 0.678 and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the positive relationship 
between accruals and cash ﬂows are stronger in local companies. HK local share 
companies have more accounting conservatism than A-share companies due to the 
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diﬀerences in the two levels factors between them. In the test for H2, the slope is 
positive 0.044 but statistically insigniﬁcant, so we are unable to reject that there 
is no diﬀerence in conservatism between AH-share companies’ reports in A-share 
market and those in the H-share market, which suggests the dominant role of 
ﬁrm-level factors. In the test for H3, the slope is positive 0.719 and statistically 
significant suggesting HK local share companies have higher accounting 
conservatism than H-share companies due to the different firm-level factors. 
Overall, the accrual based tests also supported our hypothesis.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
ACC/asset CF0/asset
N mean med std mean med std
HK local share 2493 -0.017 -0.007 0.158 0.047 0.042 0.163
A-share 3719 -0.059 -0.027 0.154 0.103 0.053 0.211
H-share 357 -0.019 -0.023 0.088 0.096 0.088 0.110
AH-share HK 142 -0.049 -0.053 0.069 0.109 0.101 0.084
AH-share mainland 142 -0.062 -0.068 0.072 0.119 0.111 0.090
 
Table 6: Results for Accrual-cash Flow Model 
A-HK local AH HK-AH mainland H-HK local
Beta t Beta t Beta t
(Constant) -0.012*** -4.327 0.002 0.26 0.010 0.735
CF0 -0.494*** -45.337 -0.560*** -10.519 -0.387*** -4.224
RD -0.004 -0.563 0.016 0.601 0.024 0.668
CD 0.017*** 3.065 0.002 0.131 -0.006 -0.393
CFO*RD -0.403*** -4.857 -0.529 -1.173 -0.444 -1.039
CFO*CD 0.227*** 7.474 0.072 0.907 0.12 1.235
CD*RD 0.007 0.677 -0.021 -0.555 -0.021 -0.567
CFO*RD*CD 0.678*** 7.24 0.044 0.053 0.719* 1.672
F statistic 416.304 41.279 21.716
Adj. R2 0.319 0.499 0.048
N 6212 284 2850
Notes: *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Robustness Checks
1. Test for Red Chip Stocks
Red Chip stock companies are those with a core business in the China mainland, 
which register abroad, and list on the HK capital market. Red Chip Stock 
companies and H-share companies are both related to the China mainland, 
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but they possess an essential diﬀerence, namely, the shares for Red Chip Stocks 
companies are all tradable, while for H-share companies the state-owned shares 
and legal-entity shares are non-tradable. Compared with H-share companies, 
Red Chip Stock companies are more market oriented. They are more inclined 
to resolve conﬂicts by public disclosure rather than by insider communication, 
which give rise to demands for accounting conservatism. Because of the ﬁrm-level 
factors, there are diﬀerences in accounting conservatism between Red Chip Stock 
companies and H-share companies. There are no diﬀerences regarding accounting 
conservatism between Red Chip Stock companies and HK local share companies.







Table 8: Test for Red Chip Stock Companies
H-Red Chips HK local share–Red Chips
Beta t Sig. Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 0.010 1.058 0.291 0.034 1.836* 0.066
CF0/asset -0.387*** -6.078 0.000 -0.543 -3.913*** 0.000
RD 0.024 0.961 0.337 0.084 2.527** 0.012
CD 0.024 1.498 0.135 -0.030 -1.529 0.126
CFO*RD -0.444 -1.495 0.135 0.779 2.836*** 0.005
CFO*CD -0.156 -1.389 0.165 0.276 1.930* 0.054
CD*RD 0.060* 1.801 0.072 -0.081 -2.350** 0.019
CFO*RD*CD 1.222*** 3.508 0.000 -0.503 -1.801* 0.072
F statistic 31.282 19.713
Adj. R2 0.265 0.046
N 589 2725
Notes: sample: The ﬁrm/years for Red Chip listed companies were selected from WIND database 
over 2003-2005, using the following procedure. First, delete companies from ﬁnance and insurance 
industry. Second, for each variable the two extreme percentiles of firm/years observations are 
eliminated. Third, we eliminate all ﬁrm/years with missing values for CFO and ACC. 
 Variable: the deﬁnitions of variables are the same as the above test except CD. CD is dummy 
variable. In the comparison between H-share and Red Chips Stocks, CD=1 for Red Chips Stocks 
companies, CD=0 for H-share companies; in the comparison between HK local share companies and 
Red Chip Stock companies, CD=1 for HK local share companies, and CD=0 for Red Chip Stock 
companies.
 *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 7 contains sample descriptive statistics. Table 8 contains the results 
of the test for Red Chip Stock companies. In the first group, the incremental 
slope is positive 1.222 and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting higher accounting 
conservatism for Red Chip Stock companies compared with H-share companies.
This is consistent with H3. In the second group, the significant negative 
incremental slope -0.503 suggests more accounting conservatism is practiced by 
Red Chip Stock companies compared with HK local share companies. Although 
diﬀerent from our hypothesis, the possible explanations are that some local family 
firms in Hong Kong relied on different financing channels to those used by 
regular local ﬁrms. Further, there are a large number of companies in the ﬁnance 
and insurance industry in HK local shares, and deleting these may alter the 
nature of HK local share companies. When we add these ﬁnance and insurance 
companies into the sample for comparison between HK local share and Red Chip 
Stock companies, the result shows there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in accounting 
conservatism. The results are qualitatively unchanged when we use an earnings-
price model for this test.
2. Another Model
Ball (2003) argues that if accounting income is conservative because it anticipates 
decreases but not increases in expected future cash flows, it will exhibit larger 
transitory decreases than increases. Hence, we also use the following model 
proposed by Ball (2003)
ΔNIt = ß0 +ß1RD+ß2ΔNIt-1+ß3ΔNIt-1*RD+ß4CD+ß5CD*ΔNIt-1+ß6RD*CD+ß7  
 ΔNIt-1*RD*CD
Table 9: Test Results
HK local share-A share HK local share-H share
Beta t Beta t
(Constant) -0.002 -0.256 0.026 0.609
ΔNIt-1 (-0.359)*** -3.068 -0.028 -0.091
ΔNIt-1*RD -0.148 -0.869 -0.182 -0.162
ΔNIt-1*CD 0.179 1.459 -0.352 -1.103
ΔNIt-1*RD*CD (-0.939)*** -4.899 -0.159 -0.135
F statistic 50.824 3.656
Adj. R2 0.224 0.142
N 1209 113
Notes: *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 9 contains the results for this test. We focus on the slope of ΔNIt-
1*RD*CD which suggests an incremental persistence of losses for CD=1 
companies than for CD=0 companies. The results are qualitatively unchanged 
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for the comparison between HK local shares and A shares. But the results for the 
comparison between HK local shares and H shares are insigniﬁcant, perhaps due 
to bias because of the diﬀerent sample sizes. 
Conclusion
This paper groups factors influencing accounting conservatism into market-
level and firm-level, so as to study their effects and determine whether there 
is a dominant level. This is tested by using several special samples. We make 
comparison of conservatism between A-share companies and HK local share 
companies to test the effects of two-level factors on accounting conservatism. 
Based on this we further test for a dominant level by using a two step process. 
First, we compare conservatism between AH-share companies’ reports in the 
A-share market and those in the H-share market to test the effects of market-
level on accounting conservatism by controlling ﬁrm-level factors. Secondly, we 
make a comparison of conservatism between HK local companies and H-share 
companies to test the eﬀects of ﬁrm-level factors on accounting conservatism by 
controlling market-level factors. The conclusion indicates that ﬁrm-level factors 
play a dominant role in determining accounting conservatism. 
This paper has constructed a framework to study and analyze factors 
influencing accounting conservatism, suggests that a firm’s own demand is the 
crucial factor. Therefore, the best way to improve the quality of accounting reports 
is to motivate the ﬁrm’s own demand rather than to rely on listing in a developed 
capital market.   
Our research design is subject to limitations. Even though we found the ﬁrm 
level factors to be more influential than market factors, we did not test which 
speciﬁc factors are important and relevant, and whether or not there is a most 
dominate factor. Further research could examine these issues.
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